

The Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera said during a visit to Fort Sill, OK, "During the Cold War we knew who, what and how we would fight, but remarkable changes have occurred since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The threats to our country are now much more complex. We now have the threat of nation states, terrorists and drug traffickers. Many nations now have weapons of mass destruction"
What does this mean to you? As the Army and the other Armed Services adjust to a changing world, our ways of reacting to a potential threat have had to change as well. Our current forces, equipment and supplies will often have to be sent to where the action is. More and more equipment and material is aboard pre-positioned ships waiting to move to a regional conflict where our presence is required. The bulk of any major force build up will still come from active and reserve forces in CONUS or from forward deployed units in Germany and Korea. All of this must happen within a very short period of time. You, the UMO, are critical to planning and executing your unit's deployment to meet the range of potential threats our Nation faces.

Where is our next world crisis going to take place? Mid East? Eastern Europe? The African continent? It is a difficult task to predict the time and location of the next crisis. Most crises occur with little or no warning. Will the crisis be primarily humanitarian or peacekeeping, or will we use armed force to maintain regional stability? Will it be a terrorist threat? These questions shape our National Defense Strategy. This lesson begins with a review of our past and current defense strategies, and how these strategies have shaped the military response to requirements for military operations.

There has been an intense redirection of our military's roles and missions since the end of the cold war. For more than forty years, the U.S. and its Allies were focused on deterring and, if necessary, defeating Soviet aggression on the NATO Central Front. Our efforts were directed toward achieving this overriding goal. Our Army relied heavily on forward basing of forces in Europe, pre-positioned stockpiles of equipment in theater, and the deployment of round-out and reinforcing units from CONUS. Until the end of the cold war, the European theater remained the centerpiece of U.S. Army planning. Today, the threat of global war remains distant, however there is great uncertainty on how our future security environment will evolve.

Our current National defense strategy is based on potential threats to U.S. security. These potential threats cover the full spectrum from disaster relief to a full-scale conventional war.

Effective employment of military forces to support our defense strategy is based on our ability to maintain forward deployed and forward-stationed forces in peacetime, and on a capability to project power quickly in crisis and war. Overseas presence provides a capability to rapidly respond to crisis events when there is no permanent U.S. military force or when there is limited infrastructure in the region. It also reduces the number of forces that must be transported to the theater in the event of military conflict.

As you can see from the discussion to this point, the U.S. military has a range of missions that it must be prepared to execute in support of the National defense strategy. Many of these missions require the timely deployment of forces to crisis in many different parts of the globe. Since the end of the cold war, strategic deployment has become a critical enabling capability for carrying out our defense strategy, because we have significantly reduced our forward presence. We'll now discuss power projection and force projection capabilities, and their relationship to strategic deployment.



One of the important capabilities supporting our National security and defense strategies is crisis response through power projection. Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, defines power projection as "The ability of the United States to apply all or some of the elements of our National power - - political, economic, informational or military, to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability." Since the end of the Cold War the centerpiece of U.S., defense strategy has been power projection. Power projection assets are tailored to regional requirements and send a clear signal of U.S. commitment. Global power projection provides our National leaders with the options they need to respond to potential crises.



The ability to successfully execute force projection operations depends largely on the speed with which combat power can be assembled at these required locations. This is a critical task for Joint Force Commanders. Power projection is not new, but the frequency has increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Power projection military operations of the recent past include: Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While these operations were successful, there were problems in meeting the Joint Force Commander's requirements for having the forces in place, with the ability to fight, at the time needed. Declining Army resources (such as personnel reductions) make such inefficiencies unacceptable in future power projection operations.



Force projection is defined as the ability to project the military element of National power from CONUS or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. It is the military component of power projection. It is a central element of U.S. strategy and a constantly recurring requirement for Army operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. It is the demonstrated ability to alert, mobilize, deploy rapidly, and operate effectively anywhere in the world. Credible power projection works only if we have the ability to rapidly deploy military forces.

Force projection operations encompass a series of processes that occur in continuous, overlapping, and iterative sequence. FM 100-5 Operations identifies the fundamentals of Army force projection operations and describes the force projection processes. Included in these processes is:

- **Mobilization**
- **Deployment**
- **Redeployment**
- **Demobilization**

This course addresses each of these four processes, but focuses primarily on deployment.

The next part of this lesson provides an overview of the MDRD processes.

Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing National resources to support National objectives in time of war or other emergencies. The process brings all or part of the U.S. Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or crisis. It includes activating all or part of the Reserve Component. For the U.S. Army, mobilization is the process that provides the supported combatant commander with three basic components required for mission accomplishment. The three components are forces (units), manpower (individuals), and logistic support.



Mobilization is a five-phased process designed to be a concurrent and continuous operation rather than a sequential process. The five phases are:
Phase I - Planning
Phase II - Alert
Phase III - Home Station
Phase IV - Mobilization Station
Phase V - Port of Embarkation
Activities in Phases IV & V overlap with the deployment phases that we will discuss shortly.
Mobilization is primarily a Reserve Component (RC) function although Active Component (AC) units will be involved in many of the same steps.



Deployment is the force projection process that focuses on the relocation of forces and materiel from their origin to the area of operations. It encompasses all activities from origin or home station including CONUS, inter-theater and intra-theater movement legs, and staging and holding areas. For force projection operations, the Army must be capable of executing any combination of strategic deployments including movement from CONUS to a theater of operations, movement from one unified command to another unified command, inter-theater deployments between theaters of operation within the same AOR, and movements within CONUS.

Every deployment is unique. Many aspects of a deployment overlap and can occur at the same time. Activities within each phase can be adjusted as required, however, the fundamental planning process of deploying the force does not change. Following are the four phases of deployment. We will discuss each of these phases in more depth in upcoming lessons.
These phases include:
Phase I - Pre-deployment activities
Phase II - Movement to the POE
Phase III - Strategic lift
Phase IV - Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I)
I want to note here that we are using RSO&I as Phase IV of the deployment process as opposed to Phase IV, Theater Reception and Phase V, Theater Onward Movement as shown in FM 55-65. The new doctrine in FM 100-17-3, RSO&I, replaces these two phases in FM 55-65 with the single phase of RSO&I.

Deployment is a critical force projection process. Following the Persian Gulf War a Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) was conducted (and subsequently updated) to study mobility requirements for the post-Cold War Army. The study concluded that the Military could increase its deployability through expanded sealift, airlift, prepositioning of equipment, and transportation infrastructure. The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) which was developed to address the MRS, resulted in the Army developing a capability to provide a crisis response force of up to Corps size (5 and 1/3 divisions) from CONUS and OCONUS forward presence locations.

The following mobility standards were established for deploying this force:
(1) A light or airborne brigade-size force arrives in theater by C+4, with the remainder of the division to close by C+12. The force would be largely transported by air.
(2) An afloat heavy combat brigade with support closes in theater and is ready to fight NLT C+15.
(3) Two heavy divisions (sealifted) close in theater by C+30.
(4) The remaining two divisions and Corps support command arrive in theater by C+75.
These are the time standards and mobility requirements for crisis response that we operate under today. The Army is currently restructuring parts of its force structure to meet more demanding force deployment timelines. we'll talk about this briefly at the end of the lesson.

Force projection requires a foundation of strategic mobility to be credible. The strategic mobility triad consists of:
(1) Adequate airlift to project troops and essential equipment quickly.
(2) Substantial sealift capability to move heavy equipment and bulk sustainment supplies to wherever needed.
(3) Army Pre-positioned stocks (APS) strategically placed on land and sea. (FM 100-17-2 and FM 100-17-1 respectively provide more information on APS land and sea operations.)
Historically, 90 percent of the material moved into theater in support of sustained contingency operations or war moves by sealift, with 10 percent moving by airlift. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for providing the airlift and sealift. The Army Materiel Command is responsible for managing prepositioned land and afloat stocks for Army forces.



Army prepositioned stocks (APS) reduce strategic deployment lift requirements and greatly reduce the time required to have deploying force equipment and materiel available in the area of operations. The APS concept is that forces marry up with APS equipment after the forces arrive at the APOD.

The APS afloat (APA) is an expanded reserve of equipment for an armor brigade, theater-opening combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS) units, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks aboard forward deployed pre-positioned afloat ships. APA operations are predicated on the concept of airlifting an Army heavy brigade with logistics support elements into a theater to link up with its equipment and supplies positioned aboard the vessels. APS afloat ships are strategically located around the globe (Pacific, Atlantic, Southwest Asia) to rapidly provide the necessary equipment in the area of operations.

The land-based APS allows the early deployment of a heavy brigade in Korea, Europe, or Southwest Asia by C+4. Fixed land based sites store Army pre-positioned sets of CS/CSS equipment, Army operational project stocks (such as chemical defense equipment, cold weather clothing, and petroleum distribution equipment) and war reserve sustainment stocks. Land-based sets can also be shipped to support any other theater worldwide.



This slide summarizes much of the deployment process that we have been discussing. Note the movement from the fort in CONUS to the air and sea ports of embarkation (POE), the strategic deployment via airlift and sealift to PODs in the theater of operations, and the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration that occurs within the theater. Also note the strategic mobility triad of airlift, sealift and pre-positioned stocks depicted in the center of the slide. We'll now discuss a few of the essential organizations involved in planning and executing deployments.

Our civilian leadership and many government and military organizations share the responsibilities for conducting deployment operations. At the National level, the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) are referred to as the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA has the sole authority to order the deployment of military forces. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to the NCA. Below the National Command Authority level, deployment is largely planned and conducted by a collective body know as the Joint Planning and Execution Committee.



The JPEC consists of those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment and support of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations. It includes the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands, unified commands (including their Service component commands) and the transportation component commands. It may also include joint task forces, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies as required. We'll briefly discuss the roles of several JPEC organizations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide the framework for deployment planning through the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Subject to the authority and direction of the National Command Authority, the JCS perform the following deployment related functions. These functions are not all-inclusive and only highlight several JCS deployment responsibilities.

(1) Provides strategic direction to the Armed Forces.

(2) Provides framework for preparing and reviewing contingency plans.

(3) Apportions strategic lift for contingency planning.

(4) Provides deployment guidance.



The nine Unified Combatant Commands are shown on this slide. Unified Command responsibilities are based on performing a function (Space Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, Transportation Command) or on areas of geographic responsibility (Central Command, European Command, Joint Forces Command, Pacific Command and Southern Command). An example of a functional command is USTRANSCOM, which has the mission of providing air, land and sea transportation in support of the Department of Defense. A key deployment and contingency related responsibility of the Unified Commands is preparing operations plans for possible contingency operations in their areas of responsibility (AOR). During a crisis or war, the deployment effort is largely focused on the requirements of the supported CINC who is overall responsible for operations in his AOR. We will now look at USTRANSCOM, a critical organization in the deployment process. As the UMO, you and your unit will be supported by this command



This slide shows the geographical location of some of the Unified Commands and their Areas of Responsibility (AOR).

USTRANSCOM is the Unified Command responsible for common-user air, land and sea transportation and port management for DOD for military operations. Common-user simply means that USTRANSCOM provides strategic transportation for all the Military Services and DOD agencies.
USTRANSCOM's components are known as the Transportation Component Commands or TCCs. Their primary mission is as follows:
(1) Air Mobility Command (AMC) provides strategic airlift.
(2) Military Sealift Command (MSC) provides strategic sealift.
(3) Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) provides common user land transportation and operates seaports of embarkation and debarkation.
At this point in the lesson we have discussed the deployment process and the role the NCA and JPEC play in planning and executing deployments. We will now briefly discuss the redeployment and demobilization processes.

Redeployment is defined as the transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area for the purpose of employment, or for return to home station. Note the two different aspects of redeployment. For example, your unit may be deployed to the European theater for contingency operations. When its mission is complete in Europe, it could then be ordered to redeploy from Europe to Southwest Asia to undertake military operations supporting a new contingency. In this scenario, the redeployment process can be very similar to the deployment process. As the unit arrives in the second theater of operations, it undergoes RSO&I activities again until it is reassembled into an effective force. The second aspect of redeployment is return to home station or installation, which we usually think of when we hear the term redeployment operations.' Under this scenario, the focus is on the reception and onward movement phases of RSO&I, as redeploying units return to CONUS or their home theaters of operations. We'll now look at the redeployment phases.

Army units redeploy in the following four phases:
Phase I - Recovery and reconstitution, and pre-redeployment activities
Phase II - Movement to and activities at POEs
Phase III - Movement to PODs
Phase IV - Reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I)

These four phases are found in FM 100-17-5, Redeployment, and replace the six phases found in FM 55-65.

Demobilization is the process by which forces (units), individuals, and materiel are transferred from active to reserve status. Although the focus is generally on units and individuals, significant resources such as supplies, materiel, and support activities are dedicated to the demobilization of logistics. The desired result at demobilization is complete restoration of Army capabilities to conduct future operations. Demobilization, like mobilization, is conducted in phases.



This slide shows the demobilization phases. During the remainder of the course, we will not spend a lot of time discussing the mobilization or demobilization processes. The important point is that the demobilization objective is to restore a unit's capability in preparation for future operations. The demobilization phases are:
Phase I - Demobilization planning actions. This phase begins with demobilization planning and ends with the decision to release units and individuals from active duty.
Phase II - Area of operations demobilization actions. This phase begins with reconstitution actions in theater and ends when units and soldiers arrive at POEs.
Phase III - POE to CONUS demobilization station. This phase overlaps with the redeployment Phase III (movement to PODs) and Phase IV (RSO&I).
Phase IV - Demobilization station actions. Phase IV begins with arrival at demobilization station and ends with unit or individual departure to home station.
Phase V - Home station actions. Phase V begins with unit departure from the demobilization station, and ends with unit or individual arrival at home station.
Most of these demobilization phases are included in normal redeployment operations. The main difference occurs on return to CONUS.
This ends the overview of the mobilization, deployment, redeployment and demobilization process. The next several slides introduce deployment planning and the strategic deployment challenge. The strategic deployment challenge must be addressed by all deployment planners -- from the JPEC community to the deploying unit level.

The essence of the challenge is simply Can the available transportation (strategic airlift, sealift) transport the movement requirements (deploying soldiers, equipment, supplies) so they arrive at their destinations in theater within the force closure timelines established by the Joint Force Commander?' The answer to this question determines whether an operations plan is 'transportation feasible.' The JPEC performs a formal and detailed analysis of an operations plan to determine if the strategic transportation is capable of meeting the movement requirements. At the unit level, the UMO or other designated staff must determine the specifics of the unit's movement requirements. This means being aware of movement criteria in publications such as FORSCOM/ARNG Reg 55-1 and TB 55-46-1, to name just a couple.

This slide shows the components of the strategic deployment challenge. The deploying unit commander, based on higher headquarters or operations plan guidance, determines the movement requirement in terms of who and what will deploy. The deploying unit must also know what strategic lift mode (air or sea) will transport unit soldiers and equipment. If the unit is planning a deployment in accordance with an existing OPLAN, the strategic mode may already be identified. The unit must also determine what organic transportation resources, such as trucks and material handling equipment (MHE), are available to transport soldiers and equipment from home station to the POE. Based on deploying force movement requirements, a Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) is produced by the JPEC community and validated by the supported CINC. At this point, we'll take a couple of minutes to look at the TPFDD format.



This slide shows the header data that is found in a TPFDD. The TPFDD identifies when equipment and forces will depart the ports of embarkation, and when they will arrive at destination. On the left hand side of the slide are the headings for ULN, which is unit line number; the unit's name, and the unit's UIC or unit identification code. This slide is a little busy, so we will focus on the common dates that the TPFDD identifies for deploying units.



Look at the header information beginning with the ready to load date, or RLD. These dates are critical information that the unit requires to plan and execute deployments.

(1) The ready to load date (RLD) is the date the unit is prepared to depart its origin. For Active Component units, the origin is normally the home installation, and for Reserve Component units, the origin is generally the mobilization station.

(2) The available to load date (ALD) is the date when the unit will be ready to load on an aircraft or ship at the POE.

(3) The earliest arrival date (EAD) is the earliest date a unit can be accepted at a POD during a deployment. It is used with the latest arrival date to define a delivery window for transportation planning.

(4) The latest arrival date (LAD) is the latest date when a unit can be accepted at POD and still meets the required delivery date for the unit's destination.

(5) The required delivery date (RDD), is the date when a unit must arrive at its final destination and be ready to start the mission.

This slide shows the basic steps for solving the strategic movement challenge. The first step is identifying movement requirements. Major forces such as divisions are identified in JCS level planning documents. Once a unit is designated to deploy however, the specific equipment to be deployed is up to the deploying force based on higher headquarters or supported CINC guidance. When the movement requirements are determined, they must be expressed in logistical or transportation terms. This means identifying equipment by its nomenclature, length, width, height, cubic footage, or other applicable criteria. The deploying unit is responsible for documenting their equipment in these terms. The UMO ensures unit movement requirements (soldiers and equipment) are prepared and documented IAW appropriate movement criteria such as FORSCOM ARNG Reg 55-1, FORSCOM ARNG Reg 55-2, and TB 55-46-1. USTRANSCOM and the supported CINC use this information to simulate the movement using strategic transportation to determine if the plan is transportation feasible. Once the movement is determined feasible, the OPLAN and the

You recall that we spoke earlier of the Army'srequirement to provide a crisis response force of up to Corp size (5 and 1/3 divisions) from CONUS and OCONUS locations with the entire force closing in theater in 75 days. We now have new deployment requirements, and a force being developed to meet these requirements. After you see the new time standards, you will appreciate how efficient the deployment process must become.

This slide shows the Chief of Staff, of the Army, (CSA's) vision for deploying a combat capability. Note that the current requirement to put a five and 1/3 division Corps in theater in 75 days is changed to placing five divisions anywhere in the world in 30 days!

Why are the requirements changing? Why are we transforming the Army? Note that the vision requires transformation to a full spectrum force. This means that the Army must be capable of executing missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peacekeeping and major theater wars, including conflicts involving nuclear weapons. We spoke of these challenges earlier in our National security strategy discussion. Currently the Army maintains a force structure capability based on winning theater wars. This force structure is not the best, however, for meeting the contingency requirements envisioned in the future. In short, our forces, and in particular our equipment, must be more deployable to meet the 21st Century threats.

The Army is presently developing forces that will erase the line between our current light and heavy forces. These new organizations will have the deployability of today's light forces, but with the lethality and battlefield mobility of today's heavy forces. Many of you may have heard of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) development effort, taking place in Fort Lewis, Washington. This effort involves restructuring of two current brigades to provide the blueprint for developing an objective force to meet the CSA's vision. The Army's goal is to improve its responsiveness and deployability so it can put a brigade combat team anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff, a warfighting division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. The next slide graphically depicts this

The challenge to the Army is to get the force from the ports of embarkation to the Joint Area of Operations (JAO) within the required timelines. To do this requires combat forces designed to deploy quickly, an efficient deployment process, and a responsive strategic lift capability. Technology will play an important part in making this challenge a reality.

Our Goal: Significantly Improve Strategic Responsiveness

Develop the capability to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120 hours, & 5 divisions within 30 days to the fullspectrum of crisis.

Reduce the deployed logistics footprint by 50% from FY99 requirements.

Strategic responsiveness is achieved through the combination of forward deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, engagement & force projection. In addition to organizational changes we will aggressively reduce our deployed logistics footprint. Near term actions focus on accelerating key systems that enable strategic depolyability. These systems will enhance logistics C2 necessary to achieve just-in time logistics. This provides dual benefit of enhancing strategic deployability through reducing the amount of equipment to be moved & reducing the logistical footprint by reducing the amount of material in theater.